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0 Introduction
Jenkins [4] charges that the language advanced in Beall [2] is either expressively im-
poverished, or inconsistent. We argue that Jenkins’ objections are based on unreason-
ably strong constraints on formal theories of truth. Our primary concern is not to
defend the ‘paranormal’ framework advanced in Beall [2], but to respond to a com-
mon – and implausible – ‘revenge’-style charge directed at a certain class of formal
theories of truth and paradox. In §1, we outline Beall’s language; §2 outlines Jenk-
ins’ main criticism and the resulting dilemma. In §3, we give our two-fold reply to
Jenkins.
1 True, false and paranormal
In Beall [2] the following many-valued language (L ) is defined.
The semantic values areV = {1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0}
The designated values are D = {1, 0.75}
The connectives and predicates are defined in the following way:
ν(A&B) = min{ν(A), ν(B)}
ν(A∨B) = max{ν(A), ν(B)}
ν(¬A) = 1− ν(A)
ν(T 〈A〉) = ν(A)
ν(F 〈A〉) = ν(T 〈¬A〉)
ν(piA) =

0 if ν(A) ∈ {1,0}
otherwise 0.75
The intended interpretation is that the predicates T and F represent ‘true’ and ‘false’
in the object language. These predicates satisfy the fundamental intersubstitutability
of T 〈A〉 with A, and of F 〈A〉 with ¬A, for all sentences A in all non-opaque contexts.
The connective pi represents the semantic category ‘paranormal’ which is meant as
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a colorless term for capturing all problematic, paradoxical sentences that defy easy
characterization in terms of truth and falsity. Valid inferences for such a language are
those which are designation-preserving.
Given a standard treatment of predicate extensions, the extension of T in any
model ofL is T + = {x : 0.75≤ ν(x)}.1 As can easily be checked, this set is negation-
consistent, hence it meets the goal of ‘non-triviality’ defined below as NTP. More-
over, for every sentence A, in any model of L , there is a designated sentence ϕA
where ϕ is one of T or F or pi. This demonstrates thatL meets the goal of ‘exhaus-
tive characterization’ defined below as ECP.
(NTP) explain how, despite having both a truth predicate (in our language, for our
language) and Liar sentences, our language is non-trivial.
(ECP) explain how, if at all, we can truly characterize – specify the ‘semantic status
of’ – all sentences of our language (in our language).
These desiderata are achieved by employing overlapping semantic categories, an idea
sometimes advanced by dialetheists as a reason to accept the existence of true contra-
dictions, i.e. truths of the form A&¬A. Since the extension of T in L is negation-
consistent, it follows that there are no true contradictions. Hence, L provides a
counterexample to the inference from satisfaction of NTP and ECP by overlap to the
conclusion of dialetheism.
2 Jenkins’ argument
In Jenkins [4] it is objected that the following predicate cannot be expressed in Beall’s
language.
ν(D〈A〉) =

1 or 0.75 if ν(A) ∈D
0.25 or 0 if ν(A) /∈D
The intended interpretation is that the predicate D represents the notion of designa-
tion used in the semantic machinery of the meta-theory. This predicate cannot be
expressed because of the following sentence, A∗.
(A∗) ¬D〈A∗〉
If ν(A∗) ∈ D , then ν(D〈A∗〉) ∈ D , but then ν(¬D〈A∗〉) ∈ {0,0.25} so by the definition
of A∗ it follows that ν(A∗) /∈ D . If ν(A∗) /∈ D , then ν(D〈A∗〉) ∈ {0,0.25}, but then
ν(¬D〈A∗〉) ∈ D so by the definition of A∗ it follows that ν(A∗) ∈ D . The designa-
tion predicate D cannot be expressed on pain of a sentence that is designated iff it is
undesignated.
Jenkins calls this fact aboutA∗ a ‘model-theoretic analogue of true contradictions’
([4], 81). From this, she draws the following dilemma for Beall.
[E]ither no model language is fully adequate as a model of English,
which can talk about its own semantic machinery, or, like the model lan-
guages, English cannot express claims about its own semantic machinery.
1For convenience, we write ‘T +’ to denote the extension of T .
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If one takes the first option, then one has to admit that (Beall’s dis-
cussion of) these models can’t help us defend exhaustive characterization
or understand the Liar-like paradoxes. [. . . ] Finally, of course, if one
takes the second option, one places a familiar, and implausible, kind of
limitation on the expressive powers of English. ([4], 83-84)
Against Jenkins, we argue that this is a false dilemma. Both horns assume that the
expressibility of a predicate like D is essential to adequately model the semantics of
English; that any model language which fails to do so fails to satisfy ECP. But this
is an assumption that one might reject.2 On the intended reading of ‘exhaustive’, an
exhaustive characterization would simply require that for every sentence there is at
least one semantic predicate we can use to (truly) characterize it. As we previously
noted, Beall’s language features enough predicates to achieve this goal.
3 Reply
Jenkins appears to be assuming a much more robust ‘exhaustive’ characterization
principle when she writes,
[T]he ability of a language to express claims about its own semantic ma-
chinery is what the exhaustive characterization project is supposed to
secure[. . . ] The kind of exhaustive characterization we want, and which
Priest thinks leads to acceptance of true contradictions, is an exhaustive
characterization of all the sentences in the model in terms of their seman-
tic values. ([4], 82)
This suggests a requirement like ECP*.
(ECP*) explain how, if at all, we can truly characterize all sentences of our language
in terms that uniquely specify their treatment under the ‘semantic machinery’
of the proffered formal model.
This robust conception of ‘exhaustive characterization’ requires that formal models
of our language be capable of far more than the expression of semantic predicates
sufficient to categorize English sentences. It requires that such models be capable of
expressing every semantic value that plays a role in the formal mechanism. This con-
ception of ‘exhaustive characterization’ explains Jenkins’ demand for the expressibil-
ity of a designation predicate, but Jenkins has failed to provide reasons for preferring
ECP* over ECP.
We believe that Jenkins is conflating purely model-dependent, instrumental no-
tions like ‘semantic value’ and ‘designation’ with predicates that actually play a role
in the semantics of English. As such, the predicate D is not semantically significant,
and need not be expressible. This gives the lie to ECP*: such a conception of the char-
acterization project is based on a too-literal understanding of the explanatory power
of the formal tools involved in modeling our language.
2Indeed, Beall [1] explicitly argues against such an assumption, as does Field [3].
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3.1 Semantic values?
First, why think the semantic values need to be expressed individually? There are
five semantic values in L which correspond to the ways in which the three seman-
tic categories ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘paranormal’ overlap. The below diagram illustrates
how Beall conceives of the relation of these semantic categories and how the semantic
values fall out of these relations.
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The semantic values, then, are heuristic tools used to signal a sentence’s location
among the overlapping semantic categories. The three categories which give rise to
these five ‘locations’ are non-trivially expressible in the model-language. Beall can, in
fact, predicate (truly) of each sentence its location among the semantic categories.3
What one cannot do in L is to (truly) characterize each sentence in terms of the
semantic categories that don’t apply, as it were. For instance, given a sentence A such
that ν(A) = 0.5 we might think of A as ‘not true’ and ‘not false’, but we cannot say as
much since ν(¬T 〈A〉&¬F 〈A〉) /∈ D . If this failure of the language is what Jenkins is
concerned about, it points in the direction of a very robust conception of ‘exhaustive’
characterization indeed.
This suggests a project which aims to (truly) characterize all sentences both ex-
haustively and exclusively, that is, under semantic predicates that express each se-
mantic value to the exclusion of every other value. Why expect this? Jenkins has not
argued for the desirability of ‘exclusive’ characterization, nor has Beall said anything
to commit him to such a project. In fact, the fruitfulness of overlapping semantic
categories as a tactic for understanding the non-triviality of truth seems to depend on
a lack of such predicates. If Jenkins is advocating this aim, then her argument cuts
equally against the semantics for Graham Priest’s LP and Anderson and Belnap’s
F DE .4 Ruling out the adequacy of this entire family of semantics on the grounds of
an unargued methodological stance is unreasonable.
3.2 Designation?
Second, why think designation is semantically significant? Jenkins suggests it is the
notion of designation which is playing the semantic role that ‘true’ plays in English.
But ‘T ’, in Beall’s model, does not express the model-theoretic analogue
of the semantic property that our English predicate ‘true’ expresses. In
this model, the role of that property is played by designation, which, as
3As can be checked for all A, if ν(A) = 1, then ν(T 〈A〉) = 1; if ν(A) = 0.75, then ν(T 〈A〉&piA) = 0.75;
if ν(A) = 0.5, then ν(piA) = 0.75; if ν(A) = 0.25, then ν(piA&F 〈A〉) = 0.75; if ν(A) = 0, then ν(F 〈A〉) = 1.
4For example, in the case of Priest’s LP , consider the predicate Z , where ν(Z〈A〉) = 1 if ν(A) = 0, and
otherwise ν(Z〈A〉) = 0. Now consider the sentence λ : Z〈λ〉. Clearly, ECP* causes triviality for LP as well.
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we have seen, is not definable in the language. Hence the language is not,
despite appearances, semantically closed. ( [4], 82)
We argue that this is mistaken. Designation in the meta-language is meant to model
T in the object-language. We note that the designated values, D = {1,0.75}, and the
extension of ‘true’, T + = {x : 0.75≤ ν(x)}, are such that for any sentence A, ν(A) ∈D
iff A∈ T +. That is, A has a designated value exactly when it is true. So, designation
is a meta-linguistic device which models the extension of ‘true’, and this should be
enough to answer Jenkins’ stated charge.5
There is, however, an implicit, stronger requirement in Jenkins’ charge. In defin-
ing D as her desired truth predicate, Jenkins indicates that whatever plays the role of
‘truth’ should be such that D〈A〉 is false in cases where A is undesignated. This en-
ables us to truly say (by use of negation) that a sentence is not true. That is, she wants
the behavior of ‘true’ to deliver a dual notion of ‘untrue’ that is distinct from ‘false’.
She seems to hold that such a feature is essential to the role of the English predicate
‘true’,6 but why would one require or think this?
Jenkins has provided no argument for the requirement that ‘untruth’ be express-
ible; but the requirement appears to be based on an unwarranted assumption, namely
that ‘true’ in English is a classical notion. Jenkins seems to be exploiting the fact that
our meta-language is formulated in classical set-theory, according to which, for any x
and set Y either x ∈ Y or x /∈ Y . It is no wonder, then, that for any sentenceA, either
ν(A) ∈ D or ν(A) /∈ D . And it is because of this fact that ‘D’ is not expressible. As
we know, classical logic cannot satisfy both NTP and ECP (and hence ECP*) when
liar sentences are included in the language, so it comes as no surprise that classically
bivalent notions will yield inconsistency.
We conclude that Jenkins has provided no motivation for the semantic signifi-
cance of designation or for ECP*; hence, her arguments in no way undermine Beall’s
principal claim. In general, the above considerations suggest that ECP* is far too un-
reasonable of a requirement. It appears doubtful, then, that ‘revenge’-style objections
based on such assumptions pose any problems for formal theories of truth which aim
to solve the paradoxes.7
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5Although Jenkins never mentions validity, the notion of designation most obviously plays a role in
the definition of argument forms which are valid-in-L . On any reading, validity counts as a ‘semantically
significant’ notion of English. The question is how to understand the relation between validity and valid-
in-L . We deny the inference from (1) designation is used to model validity, and (2) validity is semantically
significant, to the conclusion that (3) designation is semantically significant. For the above reasons, we
claim that purely model-theoretic notions useful for modeling semantically significant phenomena need
not themselves be semantically significant. There may be a related concern in this area about whether
Beall’s language can enjoy a validity relation. This hangs largely on whether he can construct a suitable
conditional that avoids Curry paradoxes. Since this is not addressed in any length in Beall [2], we leave
the issue aside.
6In fact, Jenkins has pointed out in private correspondence that she thinks the expression of the ‘un-
truth’ of a sentence in the above sense is an important requirement. She maintains that any language
which fails to meet this requirement in expressively incomplete, although has not provided any argument
in support of it.
7Thanks to JC Beall and Carrie Jenkins for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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